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A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR "WRONGFUL
PENNSYLVANIA'S

LIFE":

JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE REACTION

I.

INTRODUCTION

The earliest "wrongful life" cases were the so-called "bastard"
cases in which the plaintiff child sought damages from one of the
parents, usually the father, for being born illegitimate.' A typical
claim was brought by a healthy, however, an illegitimate child. In
the leading case, Zepeda v. Zepeda,2 plaintiff's biological father
coerced the plaintiff's mother to have sexual relations with him,
promising to marry her. 3 When the two biological parents did not
marry, the plaintiff child filed suit to recover various damages
which allegedly flowed as the result of being born illegitimate. 4 The
Illinois Appellate Court denied recovery holding that illegitimacy
was an unactionable injury.5
A case similar to Zepeda is Williams v. State of New York6 in
which the plaintiff daughter filed suit against the state alleging
negligence on the part of the state for the care and custody of the
plaintiff's mother who was sexually assaulted and had conceived
the plaintiff while in a state mental institution. 7 The plaintiff's claim
was based on deprivation of property rights, a normal childhood
and home life, proper parental care and rearing, and also the burden
of bearing the stigma of illegitimacy.' While the court acknowledged
that there may have been neglect which resulted in the child bearing
some burden, the court found "the absence from our legal concepts

1. Schedler, Women's Reproductive Rights-Is There a Conflict With a
Child's Right to be Born Free From Defects? 7 J.LEGAL MED. 357, 360 (1986).
2. 41 111. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945
(1964). See also Pinkney v. Pinkney, 198 So.2d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967);
Slawek v. Stroh, 62 Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974).
3. 190 N.E.2d at 851.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 859.
6. 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343 (1966).
7. Id. at 482, 223 N.E.2d at 343.
8. Id.
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of any such idea as a 'wrong' ".9 Citing Zepeda, the court gave no
compensation for the burden of illegitimacy.' 0
"Dissatisfied life" might be a better term to describe actions of
this type, as opposed to wrongful life, because the plaintiffs are
not claiming a legally cognizable injury as a result of their birth,
but rather they complain about the stigma and other negative effects
of being born a bastard."
Other causes of action which are often confused with "wrongful
life" are "wrongful birth' '1 2 and "wrongful pregnancy". 3 A
"wrongful birth" claim is an action brought by parents of a child,
generally afflicted with birth defects, against a physician or other
medical entity.' 4 The parents allege that because of the defendant's
post-conception conduct the parents were not able to make an
informed decision regarding whether or not to continue the preg-

9. Id. at 484, 223 N.E.2d at 344.
10. While the court did cite to Zepeda, it was in the following context:
"[n]o such theory of suit has ever before, it seems, been put forward in any court
anywhere (the closest being Zepeda v. Zepeda)"(citations omitted). Id. at 483, 223
N.E.2d at 343.
11. Schedler, Women's Reproductive Rights-Is There A Conflict With a
Child's Right To Be Born Free From Defects?, 7 J. LEGAL MED. 357, 360 (1986).
Being illegitimate no longer has the negative connotations associated with it
as it once had. Being born out of wedlock does not really shoulder the child with
a "burden".
See 10 AM. JUR. 2d Bastards § 8 for a discussion of how the status and rights
of illegitimate children have changed from common law.
12. For more recent commentaries on "wrongful birth" See Symmons,
Policy Factors in Actions for Wrongful Birth, 50 MOD. L. REV. 296 (1987);
Snyderman, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth Claims: Judicial Recognition and
Acceptance, 32 MED. TRIA TECH. Q. 15 (1985); Scheid, Benefits v. Burdens: The
Limitation of Damages in Wrongful Birth 23 J. FAM. L. 57 (1984); Comment,
The Legal Recognition of Medical Malpractice Tort Claims Based Upon Theories
of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life, 15 N.C. CENT. L.J. 274 (1985); Note,
Wrongful Birth Actions: The Case Against Legislative Curtailment, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 2017 (1987); Wrongful Birth: The Avoidance of Consequences Doctrine in
Mitigation of Damages, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1107 (1985).
13. For more recent commentaries on "wrongful pregnancy" see Franz,
Calculating Damages in Wrongful Pregnancy Cases, 30 PRAC. LAW. 73 (1984);
Hampton, The Continuing Debate over Recoverability of the Costs of ChildRearing in "Wrongful Conception" Cases: Searching for Appropriate Judicial
Guidelines, 20 FAM. L.Q. 45 (1986); Weisberg, Misconception of Wrongful Conception, 16 TRIAL LAW. Q. 36 (1984); Comment, By What Measure? The Issue of
Damages for Wrongful Pregnancy, 16 N.C. CENT. L.J. 59 (1986); Note, Flowers
v. District of Columbia: Another Court Refuses to Settle the Question of Damages
in Wrongful Conception Cases, 34 CATH. U.L. REV. 1209 (1985).
14. DeVries, Jr. and Rifkin, Wrongful Life, Wrongful Birth and Wrongful
Pregnancy: Judicial Divergence in the Birth-Related Torts, 20 F. 207 at 209 (198485) [hereinafter DeVries].
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nancy.' 5 The parents normally seek damages for their expenses in
caring for the deformed child and for the parents' suffering.
The courts basically use the term "wrongful pregnancy" to apply
to pre-conception cases.' 6 While the post-conception "wrongful
birth" action is based on the parents' right to terminate a planned
pregnancy, the pre-conception "wrongful pregnancy" is an action
dealing with a healthy, but unplanned child. 17 "Wrongful pregnancy" cases are filed by the parents asserting that the physicians
or medical attendants' negligence caused an unplanned and unwanted pregnancy. The plaintiff in a typical "wrongful pregnancy"
case will aver that a physician negligently performed a sterilization
procedure.' 8
The "wrongful life" action, as it is used today, is different from
"wrongful birth" and "wrongful pregnancy" because a "wrongful
life" claim is by, or on behalf of, a child. While "wrongful life"
and "wrongful birth" causes of action both arise from the same
negligent conduct, the child's "wrongful life" claim is unique
because the child claims his very life is wrong and but for the
defendant's negligence, the child's mother would have aborted the
fetus thus sparing the child from his defective existence.' 9 With a
"wrongful life" claim there is no differentiation between preconception and post-conception negligence. "Wrongful life" looks
at the child's life itself as being wrong.
II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A "WRONGFUL

LIFE"

CAUSE OF ACTION

Not until 1967 was the term "wrongful life" used to describe a
cause of action brought by a deformed child against a physician.
This was in the seminal case of Gleitman v. Cosgrove.20 In Gleitman,
the mother contracted German measles during the first trimester of
her pregnancy. 2' When Mrs. Gleitman relayed this information to

15. Id. It must be noted that a wrongful birth suit is based on the
constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy during the first trimester of that
pregnancy. See also infra notes 34 and 35 and accompanying text.
16. DeVries, supra note 14, at 210.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Hartke v. McKelway, 526 F. Supp. 97 (D.D.C. 1981), aff'd
707 F.2d 1544 (D.C. Cir. 1983) cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983, 104 S. Ct. 425 (1983).
19. Fain, Wrongful Life: Legal and Medical Aspects, 75 Ky. L.J. 585 at
588 (1986-87).
20. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967)(overruled in part by Berman v. Allan,
80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979)).
21. 49 N.J. at 24, 227 A.2d at 690.
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the defendant, Dr. Cosgrove, the physician informed her that the
measles would have no effect on her unborn child. 22 Upon the birth
of the child, and because of his serious physical impairments,2 3 the
child filed suit against Dr. Cosgrove on the theory that the doctor
had been negligent in not informing the mother of the effects
German measles could have on newborns. 24 The claim also stated
that had the mother been properly informed, she would have aborted
25
the fetus.
The court's reasoning in Gleitman has established the obstacles
which a plaintiff must overcome in order to bring a successful
"wrongful life" action. The Gleitman court stated that the child's
complaint was not actionable because "the conduct complained of,
' 26
even if true, does not give rise to damages cognizable at law."
The court also noted that the conduct of the doctor was not the
cause of the plaintiff's impaired condition. 27 The second and third
counts of the complaint28 were also denied by the court by applying
the same rationale used to defeat the "wrongful life" cause of
action. The court reiterated that the complaint did not give rise to
cognizable damages and "even if such alleged damages were cognizable, a claim for them would be precluded by the countervailing
public policy supporting the preciousness of human life." ' 29 The
reasoning given by the court for denying the parental "wrongful
birth" claim did not continue after the case as a bar to recovery. 0
The increase of wrongful life claims in the years to follow
Gleitman can be attributed, in large part, to the medical advances
made in the late 1960's and early 1970's. By the mid 1970's prenatal

22. Id.
23. Id. When Jeffrey Gleitman was delivered at the Margaret Hague Maternity Hospital in Jersey City he appeared to be a normal newborn. It was a few
weeks after his birth that Jeffrey's substantive defects in sight, hearing and speech
became detectable. As of the time of the case Jeffrey had undergone several
operations and was attending a special institution for blind and deaf children. Id.
24. Id. at 26, 227 A.2d at 691.
25. Id. at 25, 227 A.2d at 691.
26. Id. at 29, 227 A.2d at 692.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 24, 227 A.2d at 690. The second count was filed by Mrs. Gleitman
for the negative effect on her emotional status as a result of her son's condition.
Mr. Gleitman filed the third count for the costs incurred in caring for his son.
Id.
29. Id. at 31, 227 A.2d at 693.
30. Note, Wrongful Life: Exploring the Development of a New Tort, 21
NEW ENG. L. REV. 635, 641 (1985-86).
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diagnosis through amniocentesis3 ' and related procedures was an
accepted practice and could detect certain severe congenital3 2 abnormalities and hereditary diseases ."
Upon detection, the mother could then make an informed decision
as to whether or not to abort the fetus. In addition to the medical
advancements, also adding to the increased litigation were the
4
landmark United States Supreme Court decisions in Roe v. Wade1
and Doe v. Bolton" which place qualified abortions under the
constitutionally protected right of privacy. It was at this time that
"wrongful birth" actions were being accepted. Because of these
factors, the filing of "wrongful life" suits became more popular.
Park v. Chessin3 6 and Becker v. Schwartz,3 7 in 1977, represented
the first judicial recognition of a "wrongful life" claim by an
intermediate appellate court. However, the two cases were consolidated for appeal and the "wrongful life" issue was reversed by the
New York Court of Appeals, allowing only the "wrongful birth"
cause of action to remain.3"

31. The most important post-conception genetic testing procedure is amniocentesis which "consists of puncturing the anesthetized abdominal wall with a
needle and withdrawing . . . a small amount of the amniotic fluid from the

amniotic sac. The cells in the fluid are used immediately for diagnosis or are
cultivated for later diagnosis." Stern, Principles of Human Genetics, 808-09 (3d
ed. 1973).
32. Dorland's Medical Dictionary defines "congenital" as follows: "existing
at, and usually before, birth; referring to conditions that are present at birth,
regardless of their causation." DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 336
(27th ed. 1988).
33. Rogers, III, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth: Medical Malpractice
in Genetic Counseling and Prenatal Testing, 33 S.C.L. REV. 713, (1981-82).
34. 410 U.S. 113 (1973), reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973) (During the first
trimester of pregnancy, a state may not ban nor even closely regulate abortions.)

35. 410 U.S. 179 (1973), reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973) (Doe, decided
simultaneously with Roe, is of interest because it deals with the procedural issues
incident to the abortion process.) See also Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, (1976); Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti I), 428 U.S. 132,
(1976); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, (1976); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, (1977);
Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II), 443 U.S. 622, (1979); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297, (1980); Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358, (1980); and H.L. v. Matheson,
450 U.S. 398, (1981).
36. 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977), modified sub nom. Becker v.
Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E. 2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
37. 60 A.D.2d 587, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1977), modified, 46 N.Y.2d 401,
386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
38. 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
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In Park, Mrs. Park had given birth to a baby who died after
five hours39 due to a fatal hereditary disease called polycystic kidney
disease. 40 Upon the death of this first child, the Parks consulted
with the defendant regarding the chances of giving birth to a second
child afflicted with the fatal disease.4 After Dr. Chessin informed
the parents that the chances of a second child born with the disease
were "practically nil,'' 42 the parents conceived and gave birth to
another baby who was born with polycystic kidney disease and who
43
lived for about two and one-half years before passing away.
As a result of the defective birth, the parents filed the "wrongful
life" action on behalf of the second child, Lara Park, based on the
doctor's negligence in not informing the parents of the hereditary
nature of the birth defect and thus denying them the opportunity
to make an informed decision regarding the conception of another
child. 44 The Special Term Court upheld the "wrongful life" cause
of action 45 and the Appellate Division affirmed stating that the
6
4
claim was judicially cognizable.

The Appellate Division did not discuss the "wrongful life" claim
in any detail, however, the court did note that "decisional law must
keep pace with expanding technological, economic and social
change." '47 Conspicuously absent from the majority opinion was the
public policy argument regarding the value of life which had been
48

advanced in Gleitman.

In Becker v. Schwartz49 the plaintiff child was born with Down's
Syndrome. 0 The "wrongful life" cause of action was filed by the
39.

60 A.D.2d at 83, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 111.

40. Polycystic kidney disease often involves, not only the kidney, but the
liver and pancreas, as well. With the disease, cysts form in the cortex of the
kidney. The cysts enlarge and, by pressure, cause destruction of adjacent tissue.
No specific therapy is available. Krupp, Chatton, Current Medical Diagnosis &
Treatment 545 (1981) [hereinafter Current Medical Diagnosis].
41. 60 A.D.2d at 83, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 111.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 84, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 112.
46. Id. at 88, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
47. Id.
48. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
49. 60 A.D.2d 587, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1977), modified, 46 N.Y.2d 401,
386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
50. Dorland's Medical Dictionary describes Down's Syndrome as a chromosome disorder "characterized by a small, anteroposteriorly flattened skull,
short, flat-bridge nose, epicanthal fold, short phalanges, widened spaces between
the first and second digits of hands and feet, and moderate to severe mental
retardation, with Alzheimer's disease developing in the fourth or fifth decade
.DORLAND'S
ILLUSTRATED

MEDICAL DICTIONARY

1634 (27th ed. 1988).
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parents on behalf of the child based on the theory that, despite the
mother's age of thirty-seven, the defendants never warned the
mother of the potential dangers of giving birth, and as a result, the
mother could not have made an informed decision as to whether
or not to carry the child to term." The Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court, relying primarily on Park,52 held that there was a
valid "wrongful life" cause of action.
Park and Becker were then consolidated for appeal and the
"wrongful life" issue was reversed by the New York Court of
Appeals. 3 The court of appeals in reversing the Park and Becker
courts found "two flaws in plaintiff's claim on behalf of their
infants for wrongful life. ' 5 4 The flaws which the court espoused
parallel the rationale found in Gleitman.
The court stated the first problem as:
[I]t does not appear that the infants suffered any legally cognizable
injury ... whether it is better never to have been born at all than

to have been born with even gross deficiencies is a mystery more
properly to be left to the philosophers and the theologians. 5
The court's second argument was:
[A] cause of action brought on behalf of an infant seeking recovery
for wrongful life demands a calculation of damages dependent upon
a comparison between the Hobson's choice of life in an impaired
state and nonexistence. This comparison the law is not equipped to
make 56
In 1971, the New Jersey Supreme Court again grappled with the
"wrongful life" issue. In Berman v. Allan, 7 the court's opinion
began with reference to the Gleitman case58 which had been decided
twelve years previously. In Berman, the plaintiffs filed two medical
malpractice actions against Drs. Allan and Attardi based on the

51. 60 A.D.2d at 587, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 119, 120. The risk of Down's
Syndrome increases from 1:2000 live births at maternal age 20, to 1:300 at age

35, to 1:100 at age 40, and to 1:40 at age 45. See Current Medical Diagnosis,
supra,note 40, at 987.

52.

Id. at 588, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 120.

53. 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807,413 N.Y.S.2d 895. While the "wrongful
life" cause of action was struck down, the "wrongful birth" action was allowed

to remain.
54. Id. at 411, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
55. Id.
56. Id.at 412, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
57. 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).

58. See supra notes 20-28 and accompanying text.
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doctors' failure to inform the plaintiffs of the prenatal testing
procedures available to Mrs. Berman. 9 Plaintiffs alleged that because Mrs. Berman was not informed of the available amniocentesis
procedure, she was not made aware of the potentiality of birth
defects to ier child. 60 Unaware of the risk, Mrs. Berman chose not
61
to abort and delivered an infant afflicted with Down's Syndrome.
The first cause of action was a claim for damages based upon
"wrongful life" filed on behalf of the child and the second claim
was for "wrongful birth" filed by the parents. 62 The court rejected
the "wrongful life" claim, however, it sustained the parents' claims
for "wrongful birth". 63 Although the court refused to overrule
Gleitman in regard to the "wrongful life" issue, the rationale of
the two opinions is quite different. While the Gleitman majority
based its refusal to recognize the "wrongful life" cause of action
on the impossibility to ascertain damages 64 the Berman court stated:
"were the measure of damages our sole concern, it is possible that
some judicial remedy could be fashioned which would redress plain' 65
tiff, if only in part, for injuries suffered."
The court stated that damages are not the sole, or even primary
concern, but rather the court's opinion is premised on the fact that
the child "has not suffered any damages cognizable at law by being
brought into existence." ' 66 With this absence of cognizable damages
in mind, the court stated that "life-whether experienced with or
without a major physical handicap-is more precious than nonlife." ' 67 Thus, this case can be seen as a refinement of the previous
New Jersey Supreme Court case, Gleitman, because of Berman's
recognition of wrongful life damages as uncognizable, rather than
unascertainable. Also, the Berman court, due to the Roe v. Wade68

59. 80 N.J. at 424, 404 A.2d at 10.
60. Id. at 425, 404 A.2d at 10. Citing numerous medical authorities, the
court noted that approximately 60 to 90 metabolic defects can be discovered by
prenatal diagnosis. Recent reports state that amniocentesis is highly accurate in
uncovering chromosomal defects. The procedure itself poses less than a 1% risk
of damaging the mother or the fetus during the testing. Id.
61. Id. at 425, 404 A.2d at 10.
62. Id. at 423, 404 A.2d at 10.
63. Id. at 430, 432, 404 A.2d at 13, 14.
64. Id. at 427, 404 A.2d at 13, 14.
65. Id. .at 428, 404 A.2d at 12 (emphasis in original).
66. Id. at 428-29, 404 A.2d at 12.
67. Id at 429, 404 A.2d at 12.
68. See supra notes 34 and 35 and accompanying text.
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decision retreated from the anti-abortion rationale found in Gleit69

man.

Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories7 0 a 1980 decision of the
California Court of Appeals, was the next case to recognize a
"wrongful life" claim. Curlender was the first case which established the validity of "wrongful life" suits in California. In Curlender, the infant's parents had requested the defendant to administer
certain tests to them to reveal whether either of the parents carried
genes which would lead to the conception of a child inflicted with
Tay-Sachs disease. 7' Because of the defendants' negligence, the
wrong results were related to the parents and, therefore, the parents
relied on the inaccurate information and chose to deliver the child
rather than abort the fetus. 7 The plaintiff child was subsequently
born afflicted with Tay-Sachs disease.73
4
After a thorough review of the "wrongful life" decisional law ,
the court, in announcing some general observations stated, "[w]e
note that there has been a gradual retreat from the position of
accepting 'impossibility of measuring damages' as the sole ground
for barring the infants right to recovery . .. ,75 The court cited the
Roe v. Wade decision and the dramatic increase in medical knowl76
edge and expertise as important factors in a wrongful life decision.
The court characterized the crux of the problem to be "whether
the breach of duty was the proximate cause of an injury cognizable
at law. The injury, of course, is not the particular defect with which
a plaintiff is afflicted .. .but it is the birth of plaintiff with such
77
defect".

The Curlender court held that the defendant had a duty to the
parents, and also to the child, to perform the tests accurately78 and
69.
70.
71.

49 N.J. 22, 30-31, 227 A.2d 689, 693-94 (1979).
106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980).
Id. at 815, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 480. Tay-Sachs disease is an autosomal

recessive disease that is clinically apparent by age 5-6 months and invariably leads
to death by age 3-4 years. A particular enzyme is absent which leads to an
accumulation of ganglioside in the ganglion cell. The disease occurs primarily in
people of Jewish heritage who have emigrated from northeastern Europe. See
Current Medical Diagnosis, supra note 40, at 996.
72. Id. at 815, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 480.
73. Id. at 816, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 480. In addition to a listing of the plaintiff
child's numerous problems, the complaint also alleged that the child's life expectancy was estimated at four years. Id. at 816, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 480, 481.
74. Id. at 818-826, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 481-86.
75. Id. at 826, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
76. Id. at 826, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 487.
77. Id. at 828-29, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488 (emphasis in original).
78. Id. at 828, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
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that the breach of the duty was the proximate cause of the plaintiff
child's injury. 79 As a result, the injury was held to be legally
cognizable.8 0 Damages for pain and suffering, based on her life
expectancy of four years was granted to the plaintiff."' In addition,
"[w]e see no reason in public policy or legal analysis for exempting
from liability for punitive damages a defendant who is sued for
'8 2
committing a 'wrongful-life' tort
Two years later, in Turpin v. Sortini,83 the California Supreme
Court retreated somewhat from the Curlender opinion. In Turpin,
the defendant physicians had previously examined the plaintiff's
sister in a negligent manner telling the parents that the sibling's
hearing was within normal range when in reality the child was
"stone deaf" as a result of a hereditary ailment.14 After receiving
this information, the parents conceived the plaintiff who also suffered from total deafness. 5 The Turpins alleged that had they known
of the hereditary disease, they would not have given birth to the
86
second child.
The Turpin court tightened the Curlender analysis by limiting the
plaintiff's wrongful life recovery to special damages only. 7 In
holding that the plaintiff's claim for pain and suffering should be
denied, the court gave two reasons. 8 First, it is impossible to
determine whether the plaintiff actually suffered an injury by being
born rather than not having been born 9 and secondly, even if the

79. Id. The court characterized the birth as the injury.
80. Id. at 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488. The court's analysis was as follows:
The reality of the "wrongful life" concept is such that a plaintiff both exists
and suffers, due to the negligence of others. It is neither necessary nor just
to retreat into meditation on the mysteries of life. We need not be concerned
with the fact that had defendants not been negligent the plaintiff might not
have come into existence at all. The certainty of genetic impairment is no
longer a mystery. In addition, a reverent appreciation of life compels
recognition that plaintiff, however impaired she may be, has come into
existence as a living person with certain rights.
Id.
81. Id. at 830, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
82. Id. at 832, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
83. 31 Cal. 3d 220, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 643 P.2d 954 (1982). For a critical
discussion-of this case, see Turpin v. Sortini:Recognizing the Unsupportable Cause
of Action for Wrongful Life, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1278, 1286-87, 1292-93 (1983).
84. 31 Cal.3d at 223, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 339, 643 P.2d at 956.
85. Id. at 224, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 339, 643 P.2d at 956.
86. Id. at 224, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 339, 643 P.2d at 956.
87. Id. at 238, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 348, 643 P.2d at 965.
88. Id. at 235, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346, 643 P.2d at 963.
89. Id.
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first doubt could be overcome, it would be impossible to ascertain
general damages. 9°

The Turpin court did, however permit recovery of special damages
for the extraordinary expenses accrued because of the disease. 91
Here, the harm for which plaintiff seeks recompense is an economic
loss, the extraordinary, out-of-pocket expenses that she will have to
bear because of her hereditary ailment. Unlike the claim for general
damages, defendants' negligence has conferred
no incidental, offset92
ting benefit to this interest of plaintiff.

The Supreme Court of Washington, in Harbeson v. Parke-Davis,
Inc.9a followed the lead of the Turpin court and held that the
children plaintiffs could recover special damages for their "wrongful
life" cause of action. The case involved two infant plaintiffs who
suffered from "fetal hydantoin syndrome." ' 94 Mrs. Harbeson, who

was an epileptic, was given the drug Dilantin, by the defendant
physicians, to control her seizures. 9" The Harbeson's spoke with the
defendants regarding their interest in having more children and any
possible effects the Dilantin might have on children.9 6 The defendants, without doing any research or investigation, informed the
Harbesons that the drug could cause cleft palate and temporary
hirsutism. 97 Relying on the defendants' assurances, the Harbesons
proceeded to conceive the two infant plaintiffs. Both the "wrongful

90. Id.
91. Id. at 238-39, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 348-49, 643 P.2d at 965. The court
recognized that such expenses were incurred due to defendants' negligence and,
therefore, the defendants were liable for the costs of any necessary care. In
addition, it was also noted by the court that is would be illogical to allow parents,
in a wrongful birth action, to recover these expenses, but to not allow a child's
recovery. Id. at 238, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 348, 643 P.2d at 965.
92. Id. at 239, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 349, 643 P.2d at 966.
93. 98 Wash.2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983). For a critical discussion of this
case, see Note, Washington Recognizes Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life-A
Critical Analysis, 58 WASH. L. REv. 649, 667-69, 674, 677-78 (1983).
94. 656 P.2d at 486. The children "suffer from mild to moderate developmental retardation, wide-set eyes, lateral ptosis (dropping eyelids), hypoplasia
of the fingers, small nails, low-set hairline, broad nasal ridge, and other physical
and developmental defects." Id.
95. 656 P.2d at 486. Dilantin is an anticonvulsant drug which was regularly
used in the treatment of epilepsy. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. A cleft palate is defined as a palate having a congenital fissure,
which is a groove, in the median line. Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary,
1083 (24th ed. 1965). Hirsutism is a noticeable difference in the amount of body
hair in a woman. Hirsutism can signal more serious disorders, other than the
increased hair growth. See Current Medical Diagnosis, supra note 40, at 699.
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birth" and the "wrongful life" actions were recognized by the
Washington Supreme Court. 9 The analysis the court employed in
awarding the special damages for the "wrongful life" cause of
action was similar to that used to consider the "wrongful birth"
action. 99 The four traditional tort concepts of duty, breach, injury
and proximate cause were used.' °°
The court held "that a duty may extend to persons not yet
conceived at the time of a negligent act or omission."'' Acknowledging that some courts are reluctant to recognize this duty, the
Harbeson court explained that this is because with recognition comes
"a disavowal of the sanctity of a less-than-perfect human life.' ' 0 2
After acknowledging the duty, the court found that the defendants
breached their duty by failing to observe the appropriate standard
of care. 03 The proximate cause requirement was satisfied for the
court because "were it not for the negligence of the physicians, the
minor plaintiffs would- not have been born . . .,,104
The third state supreme court to recognize some award for
"wrongful life" was New Jersey in Procanik v. Cillo.0 5 In Procanik,
the infant plaintiff alleged that the defendant doctors were negligent
in diagnosing that his mother had contracted German measles in
the first trimester of the pregnancy. 0 6 This diagnostic failure left
the parents ignorant of potential birth defects, and therefore, the
inability of the parents to make an informed decision as to termination of the pregnancy. 10 7 Shortly after the plaintiff's birth he was
diagnosed as suffering from congenital rubella syndrome.' 0

98. 656 P.2d at 494, 497.
99. 656 P.2d at 495.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. 656 P.2d at 497.
105. 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984).
106. Id. at 342, 478 A.2d at 757.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 344, 478 A.2d at 748. The child was born with multiple birth
defects, including eye lesions, heart disease, and auditory defects. Id. "An infant
acquiring the infection in utero may be normal at birth but more likely will have
a wide variety of manifestations, including growth retardation, maculopapular
rash, thrombocytopenia, cataracts, deafness, congenital heart defects, organomegaly, and many other manifestations." The prognosis for congenital rubella has
a high mortality rate. The congenital defects associated with the disease require
numerous years of medical and surgical treatment. See Current Medical Diagnosis,
supra note 40, at 803.
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The Procanik court found that the defendant doctors owed a
duty to the infant, which duty was breached because of their
negligence toward the mother, thus depriving the parents of the
choice of terminating the pregnancy. 0 9 The court also stated that
"[n]otwithstanding recognition of the existence of a duty and its
breach, policy considerations have led this court in the past to
decline to recognize any cause of action in an infant for his wrongful
life."' 0
The Procanik court went on to hold "that a child or his parents
may recover special damages for extraordinary, medical expenses
incurred during infancy, and that the infant may recover those
expenses during his majority.""' The majority did qualify its reason
for allowing special damages by stating that the recovery "is not
premised on the concept that non-life is preferable to an impaired
life, but is predicated on the needs of the living.""' 2 Finding that
"the infant's claim for pain and suffering and for a diminished
childhood presents unsurmountable problems,"" 3 recovery for general damages was denied. 1 4 The court stated the crux of the problem
as the inability to calculate the difference between non-existence
and existence with impairment." 5
The "wrongful life" cause of action was also recognized by the
Colorado Court of Appeals as a proper claim for relief in Continental Casualty Co. v. Empire Casualty Co." 6 In this case a doctor

was negligent in treating Mrs. Peek's blood type as RH positive
when in fact she was RH negative. "' 7 Mrs. Peek's husband had RH
positive blood which caused a risk of RH incompatibility in any
child they would conceive." 8
Unaware of the potential difficulties, Mrs. Peek became pregnant
for the third time but for this pregnancy she employed the services
of a different obstetrician who discovered the RH incompatibility." 9

109. 97 N.J. at 348-49, 478 A.2d at 760.
110. Id. at 349, 478 A.2d at 760. The court here was referring to Gleitman
v. Cosgrove and Berman v. Allan.
111.

97 N.J. at 352, 478 A.2d at 762.

112.
113.

Id. at 353, 478 A.2d at 763.
Id.

114.

Id.

115.
116.

Id.
713 P.2d 384 (Colo. App. 1985).

117.
118.
119.

Id. at 388.
Id.
Id.

980
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When the Peek's son was born he suffered from a hemolytic
disease12 ° known as erythroblastosis fatalis 2 and, because of the
premature delivery required by his condition, the infant had a stroke
22
which left him with substantial brain damage.
After quoting language from Berman regarding the idea that mere
existence does not allow for damages, the Colorado court stated,
''we are not willing to say as a matter of law that life, even with
the most severe and debilitating of impairments, is always preferable
to non-existence.' ' 1 23 While the court did hold that a "wrongful
life" action is a proper claim for relief, damages recoverable for
"wrongful life" were not at issue in the case and, therefore, the
24
court did not decide whether a limited damage rule was applicable.1
The court, however, did make reference to "a trend ha[ving] emerged
in recent years which allows an impaired child to maintain an action
for wrongful life and to recover as special damages

...

121

The

court then referred to Turpin, Harbeson and Procanik as evidence
of the trend.

26

An Illinois appeals court allowed a "wrongful life" type of
recovery in Siemieniec v. Lutheran General Hospital.127 In Siemieniec, when the plaintiff parents consulted with defendant physicians
regarding the possibility of a prospective child of theirs being born
with hemophilia, the defendants assured the parents that the possibility was a "low

risk.'

' 2

Relying on this information, Mrs.

Siemieniec gave birth to a son, the other plaintiff, who was afflicted
with hemophilia. 2 9 The parents sought damages for extraordinary

120. Id. A hemolytic disease is one pertaining to, characterized by, or
producing hemolysin. Hemolysis is the "disruption of the integrity of the red cell

membrane causing release of hemoglobin. DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DicTIONARY 749 (27th ed. 1988).
121. Id. Erythroblastosis fetalis is another name for a hemolytic disease.
Immunization against this disease in a newborn is possible with administration of
Rho(D) immune globulin (RHo GAM). Id.
122. 713 P.2d at 388.
123. Id. at 393.
124. Id. at 394.
125. Id.
126. Id. For a discussion of the cases see supra Turpin, notes 83-92 and
accompanying text; Harbeson, notes 93-104 and accompanying text; Procanik,
notes 105-113 and accompanying text.
127. 134 Ill. App. 3d 823, 480 N.E.2d 1227 (1985).
128. 480 N.E.2d at 1228.
129. Id. Hemophilia, if hereditary, is a tendency to bleed which is caused
by a genetically determined deficiency of some factor which should be in the
blood.

DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY,

749-50 (27th ed. 1988).
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medical expenses and also compensation for the infliction of emotional distress. The child's claim was for extraordinary expenses he
would incur upon reaching adulthood. 3 0
In holding that the child had a cause of action on his own behalf
for extraordinary medical expenses during his adult life, 3' the court
refused to characterize the action as one for "wrongful life." "In
our opinion, what Adam seeks are not damages for "wrongful
life"; plainly, he seeks the same legal rights for redress of otherwise
cognizable damages that every other person possesses. "132
In deciding to allow the child's recovery, the court used the
traditional elements of negligence. The court stated that "[w]e
believe that there is a right to be born free from pre-natal injuries
foreseeably caused by a breach of duty to the child's mother." '
By stating that the defendants breach of the duty profoundly
affected the child, the court implied that the child's injury was birth
itself. To buttress this position the court disagreed with the Berman
rationale that recognition of the claim would disavow the sanctity
of life. 34 Although the court drew the line at characterizing the
child's claim as one of "wrongful life" the pro-"wrongful life"
rationale and the award of special damages is present in the case.
As of this time, the overwhelming number of states do not allow
any recovery, general or special damages, for a "wrongful life"
cause of action.'
California, 3 6 Washington'3 7 and New Jersey J3s

130. 480 N.E.2d at 1228.
131. Id. at 1235.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1234 (emphasis in original).
134. Id.
135. A partial listing of states and cases disallowing the "wrongful life"
claim includes:
Alabama: Elliott v. Brown, 361 So.2d 546 (Ala. 1978); Delaware: Coleman
v. Garrison, 281 A.2d 616 (1971); Florida: DiNatale v. Lieberman, 409 So.2d 512
(Fla. App. 1982); Moores v. Lucas, 405 So.2d 1022 (Fla. App. 1981); Georgia:
Fulton-DeKalb Hospital Authority v. Graves, 252 Ga. 441, 314 S.E.2d 653, 654
(1984) (dicta); Idaho: Blake v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 315, 321-22 (Idaho 1984); Kentucky:
Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (1983); Massachusetts: Payton v. Abbott Labs,
386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171, 181-82 (1982); Michigan: Strohmaier v. Associates
in Obstetrics and Gynecology, P.C., 122 Mich. App. 116, 332 N.W.2d 432, 43335 (1982); Dorlin v. Providence Hosp., 118 Mich. App. 831, 325 N.W.2d 600,
601-02 (1982); Eisbrenner v. Stanley, 106 Mich. App. 351, 308 N.W.2d 209, 21113 (1981); Missouri: Miller v. Duhart, 637 S.W.2d 183, 185-87 (Mo. App.
1982)(dicta); New Hampshire: Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341 (N.H. 1986); New
York: Alquijay v. St. Luke's Roosevelt Hosp. Center, 63 N.Y.2d 978, 473 N.E.2d
244, 245-46 (1984); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 386
N.E.2d 807, 812 (1978); North Carolina:Azzolino v. Dingfelder N.C., 337 S.E.2d
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have allowed the infant plaintiff to recover special damages, however, general damages have been denied. Illinois'3 9 has taken an
interesting approach in allowing for special damages but refusing
to characterize the action as a "wrongful life" claim. This court
treats the claim in the same manner as claims that all other persons
have for cognizable damages. While a Colorado court 40 stated that
a "wrongful life" claim would be allowable, it is uncertain what
type of damages would have been granted since those particular
damages were not at issue in the suit. In sum, five states appear to
allow some recovery and/or recognition of this "wrongful life"
cause of action.
III.

THE PENNSYLVANIA JUDICIAL EXPERIENCE

The Pennsylvania courts, and a federal court applying the Commonwealth's law, have followed the majority approach toward the
treatment of "wrongful life" claims. The Commonwealth's judiciary
has refused to recognize the "wrongful life" cause of action filed
on behalf of an infant born with a defect.
In 1978, in Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hospital,'4 the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
was presented with the question of whether "wrongful birth" and
"wrongful life" claims should be recognized under Pennsylvania
law. The record showed that upon realization of her pregnancy,
Mrs. Gildiner went to the defendant physicians to discuss her
concerns regarding the possibility of Tay-Sachs disease afflicting
her unborn child.' 2 The Gildiners informed the doctors that Mrs.

528 (1985); South Carolina: Phillips v. United States, 508 F.Supp. 537 (D.S.C.
1980); Texas: Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 924-25 (Texas 1984), Jacobs v.
Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); West Virginia: James G. v. Caserta, 332
S.E.2d 872 (W.Va. 1985); Wisconsin: Damen v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis.2d
766, 233 N.W.2d 372, 374-76 (1975).
136. Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal.3d. 220, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 643 P.2d 954
(1982), See supra notes 83 to 92 and accompanying text.
137. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash.2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983).
See supra notes 93 to 104 and accompanying text.
138. Procanik v. Cillo,.97 N.J. 239, 478 A.2d 755 (1984). See supra notes
105 to 113 and accompanying text.
139. Siemieniec v. Lutheran General Hospital, 134 I11. App. 3d. 823, 480
N.E.2d 1227 (1985). See supra notes 126 to 133 and accompanying text.
140. Continental Casualty Co. v. Empire Casualty Co., 713 P.2d 384 (Colo.
App. 1985). See supra notes 115 to 124 and accompanying text.
141. 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa.) 1978.
142. Id. at 693.
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Gildiner would obtain an .abortion unless they were assured the
143
fetus would not have Tay-Sachs disease.
Dr. Kessler recommended that an amniocentesis be performed to
1 44
determine whether or not the fetus was affected with the disease.
The defendants informed the prospective parents that the amniocentesis showed no possibilities of the Tay-Sachs disease and advised
the parents to proceed with the pregnancy.'4 5 After a son, Andrew
Lane Gildiner, was born with Tay-Sachs, the parents filed the
"wrongful life" cause of action on his behalf.' 46
Quoting from Gleitman, the district court, in a short opinion,
held that "Andrew Lane Gildiner has failed to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, because he has not sustained damages
cognizable at law.' ' 47 The court also mentioned a state action,
Speck v. Finegold, 41 which had been heard by the Allegheny County
Court of Common Pleas and which, at the time of the Gildiner
decision, was pending for appeal before the Pennsylvania Superior
Court. 149

The seminal case of Speck v. Finegold 5 was decided by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1981. The procedural history of the
case began when the parents, Frank and Dorothy Speck, filed their
four-count complaint 5' in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny
County, Pennsylvania.1 2 In the common pleas court the daughter's
claim for "wrongful life" was dismissed.' A divided Pennsylvania
54
Superior Court affirmed the dismissal of the wrongful life claim.
143. Id. at 693-694.
144. Id. at 694.
145. Id.
146. Id. The child's life expectancy was gauged to be five years or less. Id.
147. Id.
148. C.P. Allegheny Co., G.D. No. 76-07752 (July 21, 1976).
149. 451 F.Supp. at 694.
150. 268 Pa. Super. Ct. 342, 408 A.2d 496 (1979), aff'd in part, rev'd and
remanded in part, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981).
151. The first count was brought by the parents against Dr. Finegold for
the birth of their daughter, Francine. Count two was filed against Dr. Schwartz
also for damages associated with Francine's birth. The third count sought damages
from both physicians and the fourth count, filed on behalf of Francine sought
recovery from the doctors because she was born with neurofibromatosis. The
fourth count was the "wrongful life" claim. 497 Pa. at 81, 439 A.2d at 112.
152. Id. at 82, 439 A.2d at 110-11.
153. Id. at 82, 439 A.2d at 113. The court held that the Specks could not
assert a claim as a result of the daughter's birth but would be allowed damages
flowing from the immediate effects of the two doctors' alleged negligence. Id.
154. Id. The superior court allowed the parents to receive damages for the
cost of raising Francine. However, the Specks' claim for compensation for mental
anguish, emotional distress and physical inconvenience was denied. Id.
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Six Justices'55 of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court heard the case.
On the "wrongful life" issue, whether the child's cause of action
was legally cognizable, the court was evenly divided and, as a result,
156
the lower courts' dismissal of the action was affirmed.
The facts of the case were as follows: Frank Speck, Jr. and his
57
two daughters were victims of the disease neurofibromatosis.
Concerned about conceiving another child with the disease, Mr.
Speck obtained a vasectomy operation which was performed by the
defendant, Dr. Finegold. 15 1 Although Dr. Finegold informed Mr.
Speck that the vasectomy was successful and he was sterile, Mrs.
Speck became pregnant. 15 9 The Specks then went to Dr. Schwartz
to obtain an abortion. 160 Again, although the operation was characterized as successful, it obviously was not, and Mrs. Speck subchild afflicted
with
sequently
delivered
a premature
neurofibromatosis. 161
Justice Flaherty, the author of the opinion for three of the
Justices 62 ruled that a "wrongful life" cause of action should stand
155. The case was heard by Chief Justice O'Brien and Justices Roberts, Nix,
Larsen, Flaherty and Kauffman.
156. 497 Pa. at 80, 439 A.2d at 112.
157. Id. at 81-2, 439 A.2d at 112. Justice Flaherty gave the following
definition of neurofibromatosis:
Neurofibromatosis (von Recklinghausen's Disease) is a disease resulting
from a hereditary defect, due to an autosomal dominant gene, characterized
by development changes in the nervous system, muscles, bones and skin.
Skin changes vary from trivial (Cafe au lait spots) to extremely disfiguring.
The condition is marked superficially by the formation of many pedunculated
soft tumors (neurofibromas); however, neurofibromas are also found on
cranial nerves and nerve roots. Bilateral acoustic (organs of hearing) neurofibromata (tumors on tumors) occasionally complicate neurofibromatosis
in children.
Bone changes are often seen. Neurofibromata are benign and malignant
change is rare. Yet, in the central nervous system malignant tumors may
appear, the most common of which is glioma of the optic nerve. The
condition is both congenital and heredofamilial (inherited by more than one
member of a family). The clinical course is variable, making prognosis at
any given time difficult. There is no known treatment or cure for the disease.
Baker, Clinical Neurology, Vol. 3, Chapter 47, p.38 (Rev. ed. 1980); DORLAND'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, pp. 1040, 1041 (25th ed. 1974); Lichtenstein,
"Neurofibromatosis," Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry, Vol. 62, pp.
822, 829 (1949); Matthews and Miller, Disease of the Nervous System, pp.
283, 284 (2nd ed. 1972, 1975).
Id. at f.n. 2, 81-2, 439 Pa. at f.n. 2, 112.
158. Id. at 82, 439 A.2d at 113.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Justices Flaherty, Larsen and Kauffman voted to reverse the Order of
the Superior Court which had denied the "wrongful life" cause of action.
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and they stated that "[elxistence in itself can hardly be characterized
as an injury . . .,,116However, Justice Flaherty phrased the issue as
"whether tort recovery for a negligently inflicted injury will be
permitted in broadened circumstances. 1 64 Noting the procedural
setting of the case, Justice Flaherty argued that the question of
damages was not before the court but only the issue of whether the
"wrongful life" claim should be heard by the trier of fact, to which
65
the three Justices ruled in the affirmative.
Justice Nix filed an opinion in support of affirmance of the
1 66
superior court's opinion denying a wrongful life cause of action.
Phrasing the issue differently than the other half of the court,
Justice Nix stated, "[t]he real question is whether the negligent
failure to prevent the birth of an unwanted child should be compensable.' ' 67 Justice Nix's primary reason for disallowing the cause
of action appears to be his belief that "wrongful life" "is an area
best left to legislative resolution.' ' 68 Justice Nix, citing Roe v. Wade
and its progeny,169 refuted any intimation that acceptance of a
"wrongful life" cause of action is mandated by the Constitution. 70
Finally, the Justice relied on an Act of the Commonwealth which
expresses a policy favoring child birth, to argue against allowance
17
of this cause of action.'
Although Speck v. Finegold dismissed the "wrongful life" cause
of action, the position was indeed precarious due to the evenly
divided court.
In 1980, after Speck was decided by the superior court, but before
it was heard or decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the
superior court was again faced with the "wrongful life" cause of
action in Stribling v. Quevedo. 172 The record shows that Mrs.

163. Id. at 87, 439 A.2d at 115.
164. Id.
165. Id.at 86, 439 A.2d at 115.
166. Justice Roberts and Mr. Chief Justice O'Brien were the other two
members voting to uphold the superior court.
167. 497 Pa. at 95, 439 A.2d at 119 (emphasis in original).
168. Id. at 100, 439 A.2d at 122. This theme runs throughout the Justice's
entire opinion. Id. at 93-100, 439 A.2d at 119-122.
169. See supra notes 34 and 35 and accompanying text.
170. 497 Pa. at 96, 439 A.2d at 120.
171. Id. at 99, 439 A.2d at 121. "Since it is the public policy of the
Commonwealth to favor childbirth over abortion . . . . Act of June 13, 1967,
P.L. 31, No. 21, § 453, added December 19, 1980, P.L. 1321, No. 239, § I." Id.
at 99, note 8, 439 A.2d at 121, note 8.
172. 288 Pa. Super. 436, 432 A.2d 239 (1980).
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Stribling had gone to appellants to have a bilateral tubal ligation
performed. 173 Despite the operation, Mrs. Stribling gave birth to a
son who was born with dextrocardia. 174 The parents filed a three
count complaint, the third count on behalf of the child for damages
75
resulting from being born with the disease.
The superior court, in holding that the "wrongful life" cause of
action should be dismissed, 76 did not address the issue in any
length. The court did, however, include the following quote which
had been included in the Speck opinion:
Thus, a cause of action brought on behalf of an infant seeking
recovery for 'wrongful life' on grounds [he] should not have been
born demands a calculation of damages dependent on a comparison
between Hobson's choice of life in an unimpaired
state and non77
existence. This the law is incapable of doing.1
Rubin v. Hamot Medical Center7 1 presented a third opportunity
for the Pennsylvania Superior Court to address the "wrongful life"
cause of action. The court's treatment of Rubin did not differ from
the disposition of the two previous cases. In this case Mr. and Mrs.
Rubin had been tested at the defendant Center, however, the results
which indicated presence of the disease were never conveyed to
them. 79 Unaware of any problems, the Rubins proceeded with the
pregnancy. The plaintiff child was born with Tay-Sachs disease; 80
his innovative claim was based on the theory that he was a third
party beneficiary of the contract between his parents and the defendants for the medical and testing procedures.' 8 '
A large part of the court's opinion in Rubin is devoted to a
rehash of the Speck case. After stating the Speck rationale, the
court wrote, "[tihese considerations are also determinative of the
novel argument advanced on behalf of Daniel that he was a third
party beneficiary . . .,1.182 In declining to recognize a wrongful life

173. Id. at 438, 432 A.2d at 240.
174. Id. at 438-39, 432 A.2d at 241. Dextrocardia is a condition in which a
person's heart is located farther to the right than is normal. Id.
175. Id.at 439, 432 A.2d at 241.
176. Id.at 444, 432 A.2d at 243.
177. Id.at 444, 443 A.2d at 242 (quoting 342 Pa. Super. at 364, 408 A.2d
at 508).
178. 329 Pa. Super. 439, 478 A.2d 869 (1984).
179. Id.at 441, 478 A.2d at 870.
180. Id.at 442, 478 A.2d at 870.
181. Id. at 442, 478 A.2d at 870.
182. Id.at 445, 578 A.2d at 872.
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claim, the court noted that it would continue to so hold "[ulnless
and until the law is altered by the Legislature or the Supreme Court
''183

Ellis v. Sherman,'8 4 in October of 1986, presented the Pennsylvania Supreme Court with the opportunity to alter the law; however,
in a six to one opinion, the Commonwealth's highest court chose
to solidify the precarious position taken in Speck. It is interesting
to note that Justice Flaherty, who supported a "wrongful life"
cause of action in Speck, was the author of the Ellis majority
85
opinion which denied the cause of action.'
In Ellis, the plaintiff, Donald L. Ellis, III, was born with
neurofibromatosis186 which was genetically transmitted by his father. 87 The complaint alleged that although the father had received
continuous treatment for his disease, neither his medical doctor not
the surgeon who treated him ever informed either Mr. or Mrs. Ellis
of the nature of the disease and the fact that it could be genetically
transmitted.' 88 Suit was also filed against Mrs. Ellis' obstetricians
for failing to inquire further into the nature of and potential
negative effects of the disease. 8 9

183. Id.
184. 512 Pa. 14, 515 A.2d 1327 (1986).
185. Justice Flaherty acknowledged this switch at the end of his opinion: "I
am fully aware that this view represents a retrenchment from my position in Speck
v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.3d [sic] 110 (1981). Although the facts of Speck
are strikingly different from the facts in this case, the ultimate question in both
cases is whether the life of a diseased child constitutes an injury for which it
should be able to recover. In Speck, I took the position that the child should be
able to recover, but since that time, I have become increasingly persuaded that
the injury in a case of this type is primarily an injury to the parents, for which
recovery is permitted, and that the extension of recovery in cases of this type
beyond that which is necessary to provide for the child's necessary care and
treatment during its life can serve only to put further strains on an already
overburdened tort system." 512 Pa. at 20-1, 515 A.2d at 1330. Of the other two
Justices that supported the cause of action in Speck, Justice Kauffman was no
longer on the bench in 1986 and Justice Larsen, holding true to this original
opinion, authored the lone dissenting opinion in Ellis. Justice Larsen's position
basically was that although the damages are difficult to calculate, that is no reason
to deny recovery. Secondly, the Justice characterized failure to adequately inform
the parents as negligence and since the plaintiff child would experience suffering
and financial expenses as a result of that negligence, he should be compensated.
512 Pa. at 21-3, 515 A.2d at 1330-31.
186. For a definition of neurofibromatosis see supra note 155.
187. 512 Pa. at 16, 515 A.2d at 1327-28.
188. Id. at 17, 515 A.2d at 1328.
189. Id.
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The Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County dismissed the
"wrongful life" count and appeal was taken to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court. 190 That court ruled that the lower court properly
held that a "wrongful life" action is not legally cognizable in the
Commonwealth.

'9'

It is interesting to note that although there is basically unanimity
among commentators and courts in recognizing that a few states
do allow a "wrongful life" cause of action, Judge Hoffman, in
writing for the superior court, stated:
[A]ppellants would have us consider and accept the positions of the
California and Washington Supreme Courts, which, according to
appellants, have clearly recognized actions for "wrongful life" on
behalf of minor children . . .It is unfortunate that the Washington

Court chose to characterize the particular cause of action it recognized
as one for "wrongful life". In separating the cause of action from
its label, and in considering the context of the Washington Court's
pronouncement, we are convinced of the inaccuracy of appellant's
assertion that a "wrongful life" action, such as the one brought on
Donnie's behalf has been found legally cognizable. 92
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court premised the child's recovery
on his ability to prove the traditional tort elements required in any
medical malpractice action. 93 The highest court found that the
child-plaintiff could not establish that he had been injured and,
therefore, had no cause of action. 94 The court gave two reasons
why the child had not, in fact, been injured. First, the court stated
that whether the child has been injured by his birth is too speculative
a determination. 95 The court concluded its first argument with:
Because we have no way of knowing what opportunities will be
available to this child or how the child will respond to life in general
we cannot say how the child's pain and suffering will compare to
the benefits of its life,96 and thus, we cannot determine that its life
constitutes an injury.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. 330 Pa. Super. 42, 42-3, 478 A.2d 1339 at 1339, 1340.
193. 512 Pa. at 18, 515 A.2d at 1328. "[T]he plaintiff must prove that
doctor-defendant(s) owed him a duty of care; that they breached that duty; that
the plaintiff was injured; and that the injuries were proximately caused by the
defendant(s)". Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 18, 515 A.2d at 1329.
196. Id. The court then referred to the benefit rule which provides: "Where
the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or to his property
and in so doing has conferred a special benefit to the interest of the plaintiff that
was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of
damages, to the extent that this is equitable." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
§ 920 (1977).
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Second, quoting from the definition of "injury" in Black's Law
Dictionary, 197 the court concluded that the child's condition was not
inflicted upon him by the defendants but rather by the child's
genetic constitution. 198 As a result, there was no legal injury. "Legal
injury connotes interference from without; it connotes the disruption
of internal controls. Here the alleged interference was the absence
of interference in a natural process." 1 99
After Ellis v. Sherman, the issue of whether a "wrongful life"
judicial cause of action exists in Pennsylvania appears to be settled.
The Commonwealth has definitely joined the ranks of those states
which disallow recovery for both general and special damages which
flow from a "wrongful life" claim.
IV.

PUBLIC POLICY REASONS TO OPPOSE A WRONGFUL LIFE CAUSE
OF ACTION

Most American jurisdictions do not recognize a "wrongful life"
cause of action brought on behalf of, or by, a defective child.
While courts generally base their rejection of the action on either
the absence of a legally cognizable injury or the impossibility of
measuring damages, 200 there are also numerous public policy reasons
which need to be considered.
A.

Policy Against Abortion

One of the public policy considerations in denying a "wrongful
life" cause of action expressed in Gleitman v. Cosgrove20 was that
the parents' only alternative to having the deformed child was to
abort the fetus, which was, at that time, prohibited by law. Although
20 2
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade
provides constitutional protection to a woman's right to decide

197. 512 Pa. at 19, 515 A.2d at 1329. Black's Law Dictionary defines
"injury" as follows: "Any wrong or damage done to another, either in his person,
rights, reputation or property . . . An act which damages, harms or hurts."
(Black's Law Dictionary, 402 (5th ed. 1979).(emphasis added by court.) Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 20, 515 A.2d at 1329 (emphasis added by the court).
200. See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967)(overruled
in part by Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979)). See supra notes 2029 and accompanying text.
201. Id.
202. 410 U.S. 113 (1973), reh'g. denied 410 U.S. 959 (1973). See supra notes
34 and 35 and accompanying text.
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whether or not she wants an abortion, this "right" is not unconditional. 20 3 Since Roe, the Court has repeatedly acknowledged the
legitimacy of the state's countervailing interests in protecting an
20
unborn life.

4

In accordance with these decisions, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania adopted the Abortion Control Act of 1982.205 This Act
specifically provides that "the public policy of this Commonwealth
[is to] encourage childbirth over abortion.

20

6

While the Commonwealth cannot disallow qualifying abortions,
since this right is constitutionally protected, the Pennsylvania Legislature has articulated a public policy that encourages childbirth.
This policy directly contravenes with the "wrongful life" cause of
action which is premised on the idea that an abortion should have
been performed.
In Berman v. Allan20 7 the New Jersey Supreme Court dealt with
a similar state policy. "Our own state constitution proclaims that
the "enjoying and defending [of] life" is a natural right. N.J.
CoNsT. (1947), § Art. I, § 1. ' ' 208 While all states might not have an
express policy preferring childbirth over abortion, it is hard to
conceive of a state having a policy that favors abortion over life.
B.

What Degree of Defect is Necessary?

A question of line-drawing becomes paramount in considering a
"wrongful life" cause of action. The facts in Turpin v. Sortini2 0 9
show that concern over line-drawing is in fact very real.
In Ellis v. Sherman,210 the plaintiff was born with neurofibromatosis. 21' A disease such as neurofibromatosis shows another prob-

lem with the question of how defective is defective? According to

203.

Id. at 154.

204. See Harris v. McRoe, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Mahre v. Roe, 432 U.S.
464 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
205. Act of June 11, 1982, P.L. 476, No. 138, Section 1, 18 Pa. C.S.A. §
3201 et. seq.
206. Id. § 3202(c).
207. 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979). See supra notes 57-69 and accompanying
text.
208. 80 N.J. at 429, 404 A.2d at 12.
209. 31 Cal.3d 220, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 643 P.2d 954 (1982). See supra
notes 83-92 and accompanying text. In Turpin, the cause of action for "wrongful
life" was filed on behalf of the child who was born deaf.
210. 512 Pa. 14, 515 A.2d 1327 (1986).
211.
Id. at 16, 515 A.2d at 1327-28.

1988]

WRONGFUL LIFE

the National Neurofibromatosis Foundation, Inc., individuals who
are genetic carriers of the disease have, for example, a fifty percent
chance of transmitting the condition to their children. 2 12 Of those
children who contract the disease, only a small percentage exhibit
its more severe form. 213 Using these statistics, in Ellis, the plaintiff's
chances of being born with serious deformities were remote. Therefore, even if the child's parents had received proper genetic counseling prior to his birth, would they have decided to have an
abortion? The mere possibility of having a defective child should
not be a sufficient basis upon which a "wrongful life" cause of
action is tethered.
C. Recognition of a Suit for "Wrongful Life" is an
Impermissible Act of Judicial Legislation
The "wrongful life" cause of action involves controversial public
choices regarding the quality of a handicapped person's life and
potential, abortion, birth control and other areas. The policy of
"wrongful life" should not be created by the judiciary but, rather,
the decision of whether or not a "wrongful life" cause of action
will be allowed to exist more properly lies with the elected legislature.
In Speck v. Finegold,2 4 Justice Nix in his dissent stated, "I
initially approach the problem from the premise that this Court is
being requested to judicially legislate two new causes of action
heretofore non-existent in this Commonwealth. ' 21 5 After devoting
several paragraphs to the topic, the Justice concluded with, "[in
an area that is as provocative as the one in question, discipline
must be exercised to avoid personal views from clouding legal
judgment. A court may only properly become involved in judicial
lawmaking where it is directed to do so by constitutional mandate,
'21 6
legislative direction, or when it is articulating public policy.
Justice Nix, joined by Justice McDermott, again expressed this same
217
opinion in Mason v. Western PA Hospital.

212. The National Neurofibromastosi's Foundation, Inc., Questions and
Answers about Neurofibromatosis.
213. Id.
214. 268 Pa. Super. 342, 408 A.2d 496 (1979), aff'd in part, rev'd and
remanded in part, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981).
215. 497 Pa. at 94, 439 A.2d at 119 (emphasis in original).
216. Id. at 95-6, 439 A.2d at 119-20.
217. 499 Pa. 484, 453 A.2d. 984 (1982).
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The right and responsibility to define what policies the Commonwealth should be pursuing are usually reserved for the legislature."'
The 1941 case of Mamlin v. Genoe2 9 described the limited area in
which the judiciary is free to articulate public policy:
The right of a court to declare what is or is not in accord with public
policy does not extend to specific economic or social problems which
are controversial in nature and capable of solution only as the result
of a study of various factors and considerations. It is only when a
given policy is so obviously for or against the public health, safety,
morals or welfare that there is a virtual unanimity of opinion in
regard to it, that a court may constitute itself the voice of the
community in so declaring. There must be a positive, well defined,
universal public sentiment, deeply integrated in the customs and belief
of the people and in their conviction of what is just and right and
in the interest of the public wealfare. . . . Only in the clearest cases,
therefore, can a court
make an alleged public policy on the basis of
220
a judicial decision.
Clearly, it can not be said that in Pennsylvania, or any other
state, there is a unanimity of opinion that a deformed fetus or a
potentially deformed fetus should be aborted or that an unborn
child should have a cause of action against a physician if he is not
aborted. As Justice Nix stated in Speck:
Clearly, there is not the unanimity of opinion in regard to either
sterilization or abortion that would justify embracing a cause of
action for . . . 'wrongful life.' I can think of no issue where the
residents of the Commonwealth are more divided than the question
of abortion.
Here, there is without question an absence of the unanimity of
public opinion that would justify the urged causes of action. To
ignore that fact is a flagrant misuse of our role as a tribunal designed
221
to implement societal values and not to create them.
D.

Claims Against Parents

If a deformed child is successful in a "wrongful life"
against a physician, the next logical step appears to
deformed child would sue his parents for not aborting
the possibility of defect was known. If the "injury" to

suit filed
be that a
him when
a child is

218. See Amadio v. Levin, 509 Pa. 199, 501 A.2d 1085 (1985); Knecht v.
St. Mary's Hospital 392 Pa. 75 140 A.2d 30 (1958).
219. 340 Pa. 320, 17 A.2d 407 (1941).
220. Id. at 325, 17 A.2d at 409.
221. 497 Pa. at 99, 439 A.2d at 121-22.
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the creation or continuation of life, a parent with knowledge of a
fetus' possible defects would then be forced to bear the liability for
failing to prevent that life. Clearly implied in a "wrongful life"
cause of action is that parents of "less-than-perfect" fetuses are
under a duty to terminate the pregnancy.
While this possibility was not actually at issue in Curtender v.
Bio-Science222 the problem was alluded to when the court stated
"we see no sound policy which should protect those parents from
being answerable for the pain, suffering and misery which they have
wrought upon their offspring. 22 3 The recognition of this type of
"wrongful life" extension would clearly impact on a couple's decision to have children and would impact on the decision to abort.
This type of claim recognition would cause undesirable interference
224
with the family unit.
E.

Other

Several other public policy reasons exist for disallowing a "wrong•ful life" cause of action. These include a court's inability to be
able to determine a child's reaction to his infirmed condition, 2 1 the
possibility of increased insurance costs22 6 and the potentiality of
227
frivolous suits being filed.
For all of the above-stated reasons, it is this author's belief that
the Pennsylvania courts have acted responsibly in not allowing a
"wrongful life" cause of action.
V.

THE PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATURE'S RESPONSE

On April 13, 1988, with the signature of Pennsylvania Governor
Robert Casey, the Commonwealth enacted a statute which expressly
prohibits a cause of action for "wrongful life. ' 22 The Act's pertinent section reads as follows:

222.
223.

106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980).
Id. at 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488.

224. See Waters, Wrongful Life. The Implications of Suits in Wrongful Life
Brought by Children Against Their Parents, 31 DRAKE L. REV. 411 (1981-82).
225. See Ellis v. Sherman, 515 A.2d at 1329.
226. See Snyderman, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth Claims: Judicial
Recognition and Acceptance, 23 MED TRIAL TECH. Q. 29 (Summer 1985).
227. See Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 259-60, 190 N.E.2d 849,
858 (1963).
228. Section 8305(b), Act 47 of 1988. In addition to disallowing a "wrongful
life" cause of action, the Act also expressly prohibits the "wrongful birth" cause
of action. Id. at § 8305(A).
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(B) Wrongful Life.-There shall be no cause of action on behalf of
any person based on a claim of that person that, but for an act or
omission of the defendant, the person would not have been
conceived
229
or, once conceived, would or should have been aborted.

Much controversy surrounded the passage of the statute with such
groups as the American

Civil Liberties

Union of Pennsylvania,

Pennsylvania Catholic Conference, Pennsylvania Pro-Life Federation and Planned Parenthood participating in the process. Interest-

ingly, this was not the first time a Pennsylvania Legislature has
sent a "wrongful life" bill to the Governor.
On July 3, 1984, then Governor Dick Thornburgh vetoed Senate
Bill 750 which contained "wrongful life" language. However, the

Governor's complaint was not directed at the "wrongful life" part
of the bill. "I have no objection to the provisions in this bill which
would bar as a defense in certain tort and support actions the claim
that the child involved should have been aborted. ' 230 Rather, the
Governor's objection, and the reason for the veto, dealt with the
23
"wrongful birth" language.
229. Section 8305(B), Act 47 of 1988.
230. Veto Message from Governor Dick Thornburgh (July 3, 1984).
231. The veto message included the following regarding "wrongful birth":
I have serious reservations, however, about the portion of this bill which
would close the courts to cases of so-called "wrongful birth" claims. Under
current law, Pennsylvania courts have not recognized actions for so-called
"wrongful life." Only three of the 50 states have enacted statutes which bar
claims for "wrongful birth."
I recognize and concur in the belief expressed by proponents of S.B.
750 that every life is sacred and that the life of a handicapped or retarded
child is of no lesser value than the life of a healthy child. However, the
issue presented by S.B. 750 is not on the comparative value of lives, but
whether prospective parents are entitled to relevant information regarding
the risks of conception and birth to the mother and the child so they might
make an informed decision and whether medical staff should be held legally
liable for the effective delivery of care.

Also, the enactment of blanket immunity for doctors, hospitals and
medical personnel for acts of neglect or malpractice in these situations could,
unfortunately lead to a reduction in the level of care and quality of treatment
in certain cases of pregnancy. As a result, opportunities which exist to detect
and mitigate certain potential diseases and defects in the developing fetus
could be lost.
• . . The reservations I have set forth cause me sufficient concern to
reject the imposition of the blanket legal immunity provided for in this
measure. Accordingly, I am herewith returning S.B. 750 without my signature.
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Several times the Pennsylvania courts have commented that the
judiciary should not decide the "wrongful life" issue but instead
should leave that issue to the legislature. 232 It appears that since the
enactment of Senate Bill 646, the legislature has solidified the state
courts' non-recognition of a "wrongful life" cause of action.
Donna J. Long

232. See Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77 at 100, 439 A.2d 110 at 122 (1981)
(Nix, J., dissenting). This theme runs throughout the Justice's entire opinion. Id.
at 93-100, 439 A.2d at 119-122; Rubin v. Hamot Medical Center, 329 Pa. Super.
439, 445, 578 A.2d 869, 872 (1984).

